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Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family
Responsibilities Discrimination and
Stereotyping Evidence
CATHERINE ALBISTON
KATHRYN BURKETr DICKSON
CHARLOTTE FISHMAN
LESLIE F. LEVY*
This Article highlights ten key lessons that employment law
practitioners can take away from this symposium Issue. The legal field of
family responsibilities discrimination (FRD) has developed rapidly in the
past two decades, with FRD litigation only likely to increase. Social
science research on the maternal wall continues to develop, increasing
our understanding of what discrimination looks like in the workplace
today. The FRD case law and social science research highlighted in this
Issue provide essential information that employment law attorneys can
put into practice when faced with addressing FRD in the workplace.
LESSON I
FRD is a real theory of liability for which plaintiffs can sue, supported by
existing case law and the recent EEOC Enforcement Guidance.
Practitioners should watch for typical fact patterns giving rise to FRD
litigation when interviewing clients.
While new legislation codifying FRD at both the federal and state
levels would be desirable, lawyers for employees are already successfully
litigating FRD cases. Existing legal theories, supported by a growing
body of case law and the Enforcement Guidance on caregiver
* The Authors contributed equally to this Article. Catherine Albiston is an Assistant Professor
of Law at the University of California Berkeley's Boalt Hall School of Law. Kathryn Burkett Dickson
is a partner at the law firm of Dickson-Ross LLP, specializing in employment law. Charlotte Fishman
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discrimination recently issued by the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC),' have produced favorable results in
many cases raising FRD issues. The article by Joan Williams and
Stephanie Bornstein in this symposium Issue, Family Responsibilities
Discrimination and Developments in the Role of Stereotyping and Implicit
Bias Evidence,' provides a readable and useful analysis of existing legal
theories that plaintiffs' lawyers have utilized in cases around the country.
All practitioners in the field of employment law should review the article.
As Williams and Bornstein demonstrate, employees have
successfully brought FRD cases, particularly disparate treatment sex and
pregnancy discrimination cases, under Title VII and parallel state laws.'
Williams and Bornstein point out that caregiver plaintiffs have
successfully sued for disparate impact, retaliation, harassment, and
constructive discharge under such laws, and that caregiver plaintiffs have
also succeeded on theories of "sex discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause and the Equal Pay Act."5
The Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") 6 and its state
equivalents provide family caregivers with additional causes of action:
plaintiffs have sued successfully when their employers denied, interfered
with, or retaliated against them for exercising their right to take
protected family and medical leave.' Lawyers representing FRD
plaintiffs have also won cases "under the 'association clause' of the
Americans with Disabilities Act... [("ADA")'] and the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act... [("ERISA")9], the major federal law
that governs health and retirement benefits."'" Finally, attorneys bringing
these actions have also achieved victories in representing mothers and
other caregivers under a variety of additional state common law claims."
From a practical perspective, how does a practitioner spot a
potential FRD claim? Both the Williams and Bornstein article and the
EEOC Enforcement Guidance provide excellent roadmaps, with
i. Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615 (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/caregiving.pdf [hereinafter EEOC Guidance].
2. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of "Fred": Family Responsibilities
Discrimination and Developments in the Role of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias Evidence, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1311 (2008).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe (2008).
4. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 1344-45.
5. Id. at 1345 (footnotes omitted).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 26Ol-2654, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6385 (2006).
7, Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 1345.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)( 4 ) (2006).
9. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)
(codified in scattered sections of 26, 29 U.S.C.).
Io. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 1345-46 (footnotes omitted).
i i. See id. at 1346.
[VOL. 59:1285
TEN LESSONS FOR PRA CTITIONERS
numerous examples of fact patterns and associated legal theories that
plaintiffs' lawyers should consider when interviewing clients." The
following are examples of the kinds of questions workers' lawyers should
ask clients in potential FRD cases:
e Were you asked during hiring interviews questions such as: do you
have children, how many, their ages, or whether and when you
intend to have children, what childcare arrangements you have,
whether you have other care-giving responsibilities (aging parents),
and other similar questions?
e Do you know other women with children who have had negative
experiences with this employer?
9 Have you heard of managers or supervisors making stereotypical
or derogatory comments about pregnant workers or about working
mothers or other female caregivers at this employer?
e Did things change for you in the workplace when you became a
mother or a caregiver?
e Were you treated differently when you announced that you were
pregnant with a second [or third] child, sometimes referred to by
practitioners as "the second baby syndrome?"
e Were you ostracized or treated differently after you returned from
a family or care-giving leave or once your employer learned you
planned to take leave or begin care-giving responsibilities?
e Were you unable to get promoted or were you unable to obtain
desirable assignments once you had a child?
* Did your performance reviews drop after pregnancy or childbirth
despite continuing good performance on your part?
* Was there increased scrutiny of your work after you announced
your pregnancy or returned from family leave?
a Were work rules suddenly applied to you after leave or childbirth
that were not being applied to others or that had not been applied to
you prior to leave, such as punctuality or attendance requirements?
e Were you subjected to other negative employment terms or
conditions when you became a mother, such as transfer to a different
shift or a different location, that made picking up children from
school or childcare more difficult?
* Were you denied requests for a part-time or flexible schedule that
had been previously allowed or was permitted for other workers who
did not have care-giving responsibilities?
12. See EEOC Guidance, supra note i, at 1-32. See generally Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2.
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* If the client is male, were you shamed or pressured out of taking a
leave to which you were entitled or treated differently when you
returned from leave?
If a conventional sex or pregnancy discrimination claim or family
leave case is present, should the practitioner consider additional claims in
the context of FRD, or simply litigate the case under traditional
theories? The answer is the former: because of the many legal theories
under which FRD claims have been brought, 3 analyzing the claim in the
larger context of FRD may well increase the scope of possible discovery
and the available remedies, including injunctive relief. Considering such
claims more broadly may also lead to uncovering larger issues or
dynamics that you and your client may wish to address in that particular
workplace, including the possibility of multiple plaintiff or class cases if a
pattern or practice of discrimination seems to be emerging. To do so, you
need to ask questions that allow you to consider these issues in the
context of the workplace as a whole, rather than limiting your inquiry to
the leave itself. Examples of these inquiries include the following:
* What happens to women who work for this employer after they
come back from family leave?
* After women return from leave, are they denied promotions or
good assignments?
* Do women's career trajectories and access to opportunities for
advancement change from before they had children to after they
became mothers?
If you inquire further, you may find that there are claims based on
stereotypes of mothers, in addition to the pregnancy leave claims.
Bringing in other claims that implicate FRD and the stereotyping of
mothers also will help fend off the typical defense that there is no
discrimination because women have been rehired after pregnancy.
Practitioners can point to the differential treatment of women and the
change in their careers once they become mothers to show that the case
(and the problem in the workplace) is not just about pregnancy or
pregnancy leave, but a much broader problem arising from stereotypes in
the workplace that persist far beyond the period of pregnancy and
childbirth.
Finally, practitioners should consider the problem of "second baby
syndrome" alluded to above. An employee with one child in many
instances can "pass" or may be able to perform as well in the employer's
eyes as a worker who has no children-but, of course, that may be
accomplished at considerable effort on the employee's part and with
13. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 1344 (stating that the Center for WorkLife Law has
identified seventeen legal theories for pursuing FRD claims).
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barely concealed frustration on the part of the employer. Once the
worker announces that she is pregnant with a second child, the
employer's "tolerance" is exceeded and discriminatory attitudes emerge,
often with a vengeance. And if a second pregnancy causes a stir, it can be
exponential with a third child. One case that demonstrates the
emergence of this attitude is Sheehan v. Donlen Corp.,'4 in which, after
announcing that she was pregnant with her third child, the plaintiff was
the only employee whose performance was scrutinized, and she was
ultimately fired based on the assumption that she should spend more
time "at home with [her] children."'5
The key point for practitioners is that if a potential client walks into
your office with a pregnancy or leave case, you should think more
broadly and consider enlarging the scope of the case to include other
available FRD claims. This may make for a stronger case, may lead to
enlarging the protections for other employees, and will continue to
expand the law in this important area. The articles in this symposium
Issue are a great aid in accomplishing these goals.
LESSON 2
Proving FRD is no different than proving any other type of
discrimination -an inference is drawn from the totality of circumstances
presented. The range of evidence is the same, although the availability of
direct evidence of discrimination may be greater.
What evidence is available to prove family responsibilities
discrimination? It is helpful to remember that discrimination is an
inference that is drawn from the totality of circumstances presented.'6
Linda Krieger and Susan Fiske provide a useful typology of proof that
may be available to support an inference of discrimination. 7 The type of
evidence a trier of fact may consider includes:
* comparative evidence
" statements that demonstrate negative stereotypes or attitudes
toward the protected group
* harassment that is allowed to continue unchecked
" statistical or other pattern-and-practice evidence
" lack of credibility of the reason cited by the employer for taking
the adverse action(s) at issue
14. 173 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1999).
15. Id. at 1042-43.
I6. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 57 (4th ed.
2007) (stating that "a finding for the plaintiff is permitted where the fact finder, considering all of the
evidence in the record, could reasonably infer that unlawful discrimination occurred").
I7. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1059-6o (2006).
June 2008]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
9 evidence of defects in the decision-making process that provide an
opportunity for biased decision making'8
The language of Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to
"fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 9 Title VII now
includes pregnancy discrimination within the covered basis of sex
discrimination, but nothing in the statute expressly offers job-related
protection for workers discriminated against because of caregiving
responsibilities." Nonetheless, there are particular patterns of caregiver
discrimination that can be addressed under existing protected categories.
The EEOC Enforcement Guidance2 provides a helpful analysis of family
responsibilities discrimination and identifies fact patterns that can be
litigated under existing protected categories.
Discrimination against mothers on the basis of gender. In the case of
discrimination against mothers of young children, attorneys can prove
disparate treatment under Title VII by a variety of comparisons. One
approach is to compare a plaintiff's qualifications to those of fathers of
young children who were promoted (demonstrating straight gender
discrimination through direct comparison with similarly situated males).2
The plaintiff can also be compared with her former, non-mother self;
with men (whether or not fathers); and with women who are not mothers
or have grown children (demonstrating "sex plus" discrimination, i.e.,
employer discrimination against a subset of women, not all women). 3
However, evidence that an employer treats both male and female
caregivers less favorably than noncaregivers of either sex will not suffice
to raise an inference of discrimination under Title VII.
2 4
In addition to, or in the absence of, comparative evidence, evidence
that disparate treatment of a complainant occurred because of
stereotyping may be actionable as sex discrimination. 5 While many
mothers do curtail their work responsibilities, the stereotyped
assumption that a particular woman will or should do so may not be used
I8. Id.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a)(I) (2006).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
21. See EEOC Guidance, supra note I, at I.
22. See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 1351 n.268.
23. Id. at 1344-47.
24. See, e.g., LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 509-1o (discussing how courts have
viewed distinctions based on marital status or leave of absence that are applied equally to men and
women as gender discrimination under Title VII only where they result in a disparate impact on one
gender).
25. See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 1350.
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to prevent her from being considered for a promotion, a leadership
opportunity, or a job that requires travel. 6 Stereotyping need not involve
hostile animus in order to form the basis of a discrimination claim. 7
Counsel should be alert to the possibility that sex stereotyping may
have affected performance evaluations as a result of implicit bias. Even
without consciously held beliefs about how women will or should act
once they have children, bias against caregivers may affect how a
woman's performance is evaluated."
Discrimination against fathers on the basis of gender. Male caregivers
may also bring claims of sex discrimination under appropriate
circumstances. A male plaintiff bringing a Title VII claim of
discrimination on the basis of gender may proffer evidence that he was
prohibited from taking advantage of employer benefits made available to
mothers with care-giving responsibilities-for example, part-time work,
parental leave, or flexible work arrangements. In addition, evidence of
gender stereotyping, such as prescriptive insistence on gender conformity
(e.g., real men are breadwinners, not caregivers) may also be probative
of sex discrimination in the workplace.
Discrimination against caregiver employees on the basis of
"association" with a person with a disability. Employees may also be
subjected to a form of discrimination actionable under the ADA if they
come to the job with (or later assume) care-giving responsibilities for
adults. The ADA prohibits discrimination based on "association" with an
individual with a disability. 9 Denying a job to someone with a family
member needing care, or harassing an employee by manipulating existing
work schedules to interfere with care-giving responsibilities, may be
actionable under the ADA. In addition, interference with rights afforded
by the FMLA and/or restricting or denying access to existing employer
benefit programs may provide evidence to support a caregiver
discrimination claim. Frequently, discrimination in the FRD context
revolves around the need to take leave (e.g., caring for a parent who is
suffering a health crisis), or intermittent time off for exigencies that arise
26. Id. at 1354 & n.291; see also EEOC Guidance, supra note i, at 8-21.
27. See EEOC Guidance, supra note i, at 17 (stating, in a discussion of "benevolent
stereotyping," that "adverse actions that are based on sex stereotyping violate Title VII, even if the
employer is not acting out of hostility," and citing UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 199-200
(199I)); see also Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3 d 580,583 (7th Cir. 2004).
28. See generally Stephen Benard, In Paik & Shelley J. Correll, Cognitive Bias and the
Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINrs L.J. 1359, (2008) [hereinafter Benard et al.]; Shelley J. Correll.
Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. Soc. 1297, 1317-
23 (2007) [hereinafter Correll et al.].
29. 42 U.S.C. § Zi2(b)(4 ) (2oo6) (prohibiting employment discrimination "because of a known
disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or
association").
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(such as doctor's appointments or a sick child)." Thus, comparing the
treatment of caregivers with the treatment of noncaregivers who take
leaves of absence or require intermittent time off is another potentially
fruitful area of inquiry.
Discrimination against caregivers on the basis of race or national
origin plus gender. Cultural stereotypes may create discrimination
against caregivers who belong to other protected categories. Evidence
that an employer treats caregivers of a particular race, national origin, or
religion differently than other caregivers should be evaluated as a basis
for an "intersectional discrimination" claim-for example, race plus
motherhood -giving rise to causes of action for both race and sex
discrimination.3'
Retaliation. Withdrawal of previously granted accommodations
(such as schedule adjustments or flexible work arrangements) that affect
the employee's ability to perform care-giving responsibilities as
punishment for filing a discrimination charge may be actionable
retaliation, even if the original charge is based on a protected status
other than caregiving, such as race.
Hostile work environment. Finally, as with any newly identified form
of discrimination, it is possible to find cases in which evidence of
discrimination is open and notorious.33 For example, an employer may
overtly criticize an employee for her decision to have children, take away
coveted job responsibilities, or subject her to unusual scrutiny or public
humiliation, on the express grounds that women with children do not
belong in the workplace. Conversely, an employer may demand gender
conformity from a male employee by denying accommodation on the
grounds that "real men" do not need time off for caregiving, and may
make it more difficult for the employee to obtain schedule flexibility
freely granted to others. Counsel should analyze the viability of a hostile
work environment claim based on evidence of harassment related to
caregiver status by considering the standards applied to a harassment
claim for the relevant Title VII or ADA-protected category. The
30. See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 1347 nn.244-45. See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS,
CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW, ONE SICK CHILD AWAY FROM BEING FIRED: WHEN "OPTING OUT" Is NOT
AN OPnON (2006), available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/onesickchild.pdf (describing numerous
arbitrations involving workers who needed leave or intermittent time off).
31. See, e.g., EEOC Guidance, supra note I, at 28 (stating that "[w]omen of color also may be
subject to intersectional discrimination that is specifically directed toward women of a particular race
or ethnicity, resulting, for example, in less favorable treatment of an African American working
mother than her White counterpart") (citing Race & Color Discrimination, 2 EEOC Comp. Man.
(BNA) §i5 -IV-C (2oo6), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html#IVC).
32. See, e.g., Washington v. I11. Dept. of Rev., 42o F.3d 658, 662 (7 th Cir. 2005).
33. See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 1348.
[VOL. 59: 1285
TEN LESSONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
recently published EEOC Enforcement Guidance contains helpful
examples. 4
LESSON 3
Social science research has shown the value of "stray remarks" as
providing a window into the hidden biases in the workplace. Courts are
beginning to understand this and call the so-called "stray remarks"
doctrine into question.
In many employment discrimination cases in which plaintiffs
produce evidence of one or more overtly biased remarks, courts often
exclude such evidence, dismissively referring to the comments as mere
"stray remarks," which implies that they are entitled to no evidentiary
weight whatsoever.35 Some courts have elevated the status of this
evidentiary exclusion, labeling it the "stray remarks doctrine."" Social
science research has debunked the notion that such remarks have no real
meaning or value in deciphering employment decisions or workplace
culture. 7 Some courts are finally coming around. In Mattenson v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner recently
wrote about such "stray remarks," perceptively stating:
[I]n this day and age, for executives at the vice-presidential level of a
major business enterprise to be talking openly about the desirability of
getting rid of old employees is at least some evidence of the
discriminatory workplace culture .... Not that testimony about a
work-place "culture" as such is admissible; it is too vague. But
testimony based on the personal knowledge of the testifying employees
can provide a basis for an inference that discriminatory attitudes
permeate a firm's employment policies and practices.
Language in some judicial opinions suggests that prejudicial remarks
are always to be excluded unless they are made by someone who had
input into the decision to terminate (or take other challenged adverse
employment action against) the plaintiff .... The admissibility of
"stray remarks," as the cases call them, is governed by Rule 403 of the
evidence rules, which establishes a standard rather than a rule-and a
standard that tilts in favor of admissibility; the probative value of the
evidence must not merely be outweighed, it must be substantially
outweighed, by its negative consequences, to be excludable. And that
will depend on context-the circumstances in which the remarks were
34. EEOC Guidance, supra note I, at 28-30.
35. See, e.g., Bright v. Standard Register Co., 66 F.3d 171, 172-73 (8th Cir. 1995); Horn v.
Cushman & Wakefield, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459,467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
36. See Laina Rose Reinsmith, Proving an Employer's Intent: Disparate Treatment Discrimination
and the Stray Remarks Doctrine After Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 55 VAND. L. REV. 219
(2002).
37. See, e.g., Krieger & Fiske, supra note 17, at l005-O6.
38. 438 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2oo6).
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made, such as the number of similar remarks, when they were made,
and by whom and to whom they were made.39
As Judge Posner recognized, in this day and age managers are well aware
that overtly discriminatory remarks are proscribed in the workplace.
Thus, when such remarks are uttered, they can take on heightened
importance -indeed, they may provide a "glimpse" or a "window" into
the true, but partially repressed, attitudes of such managers. Far from
being irrelevant, they should be weighed based on the context in which
they were expressed.
Such remarks are also evidentiary of the culture of the workplace in
that a manager who makes such overt comments feel emboldened or
permitted to make them. In social science terms, the speaker in this
instance is using schemas and also making a presumption about the
acceptability of the remarks to the listener, thus providing some evidence
of the workplace culture, particularly where the speaker is a manager or
supervisor.'
The United States Supreme Court has also emphasized the
importance that "isolated" remarks can have when viewed in proper
context. In Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,"' the Court reversed a
determination by the Eleventh Circuit that use of the term "boy" by a
white plant manager towards an adult African American plant
superintendent was not evidence of discriminatory animus, despite the
jury finding of discrimination, where the manager failed to use the
modifier "black," as in "black boy."' The Supreme Court noted, "[t]he
speaker's meaning may depend on various factors including context,
inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage."'43
The California Supreme Court recently granted review in Reid v.
Google, Inc. to determine whether and to what extent California law
should recognize the "stray remarks doctrine."" The appellate court
decision facing review reversed summary judgment for the employer, and
as part of its lengthy opinion, discussed "stray remarks" in some detail.45
In Reid, the plaintiff claimed age discrimination, arguing that Google had
a "youthful" culture that discriminated against older workers. 6 He
39. Id. at 770-71 (citations omitted).
40. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. II6i, 1183-85, i88, 1190, iI99-
1200 (I995) (schemas); see, e.g., Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995)
(stray remarks can reveal workplace culture); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217
F.3d 46, 55 (ist Cir. 2000) (same).
41. 546 U.S. 454 (2006) (per curium).
42. Id. at 455-58.
43. Id. at 456.
44. 175 P.3d 1170 (Cal. 2008).
45. Reid v. Google, Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 744,759 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
46. Id. at 758-59.
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provided evidence of "ageist" comments, which were discounted by the
trial court in granting summary judgment, including examples such as his
manager labeling the plaintiff as 'slow," "fuzzy," "sluggish," and
"lethargic" and calling his ideas "obsolete" and "too old to matter."47 In
addition, co-workers referred to the plaintiff as "old man" and "old
fuddy-duddy. 8
Google argued at length that these comments were simply stray
remarks that did not raise a triable issue of fact as to pretext, citing cases
applying the "stray remarks" doctrine.49 The appellate court responded
that it could not view the "stray remarks" rule "as anything other than
the assumption by the court of a factfinding role."5 Clearly stating its
view, the court wrote:
We do not agree with suggestions that a "single, isolated
discriminatory comment" or comments that are "unrelated to the
decisional process" are "stray" and therefore, insufficient to avoid
summary judgment. There are certainly cases that in the context of the
evidence as a whole, the remarks at issue provide such weak evidence
that a verdict resting on them cannot be sustained. But such judgments
must be made on a case-by-case basis in light of the entire record, and
on summary judgment the sole question is whether they support an
inference that the employer's action was motivated by discriminatory
animus. Their "weight" as evidence cannot enter into the question.'
This case-by-case, contextualized approach is similar to that recently
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in a slightly different
employment law context. In the 2008 decision in Sprint/United
Management Co. v. Mendelsohn,52 the Court held that so-called "me too"
evidence -testimony by co-workers who also claim discrimination -was
neither per se admissible (as the trial court held) or per se inadmissible
(as the Tenth Circuit held) under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and
403."3 Instead, the Court concluded that its relevance "depends on many
factors including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff's
circumstances and theory of the case," and, furthermore, that Rule 403
"also requires a fact-intensive, context-specific inquiry. 54
Briefing is currently underway in the California Supreme Court on
Reid v. Google5 The court's guidance on the "stray remarks" rule and
47. Id. at 748.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 759.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citations omitted).
52. 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2oo8).
53. Id. at 1147.
54. Id.
55. See News Release, Judicial Council of California, Summary of Cases Accepted During the
Week of January 28, 2oo8, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/summaries/
WS0128o8.PDF.
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California law is being eagerly awaited by employment practitioners
representing both employers and employees.
As social science research mounts and more courts acknowledge that
"[c]ontext matters ,6-indeed it matters a lot-in these cases, the "stray
remarks" doctrine may be cast aside. 7
LESSON 4
Social science research has identified common patterns of stereotyping that
mothers face in the workplace. Practitioners should be aware of these
stereotypes so they can spot them when talking to clients.
Employers cannot use gender stereotypes associated with family
responsibilities as the basis for adverse employment decisions.s In their
article in this Issue, Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, Benard,
Paik, and Correll summarize studies that document stereotypes that
mothers face at work.59 Common stereotypes include assumptions that
women with small children will be less dependable or productive than
other employees;6° that mothers will not, or should not, work long
hours; and that mothers are not committed to their jobs.62 In addition,
workplace penalties for women who take family leave or make use of
flexible schedules may reflect assumptions that these workers are
56. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2oo6).
57. Social science is also useful in overcoming the so-called "honest belief rule" that exists in
certain jurisdictions. Under this rule, as Faigman, Dasgupta, and Ridgeway describe it in their article
in this Issue, "if an employer honestly believed that the motivating factor for the negative employment
decision was nondiscriminatory, he or she would not be liable under the law." David L. Faigman,
Nilanjana Dasgupta & Cecilia L. Ridgeway, A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the
Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINOs L.J. 1389, 1395 (2008) [hereinafter Faigman et al.]. Practitioners
faced with the "honest belief rule" should be aware that there are many ways to use social science to
discount and overcome it. See id. at 1396-1402 (for a discussion); see also Krieger & Fiske, supra note
17, at io34-38.
58. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542, 547 n.3 (x97); EEOC Guidance, supra
note I, at i4; see also Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
59. See Benard et al., supra note 28, at 1368-77.
6o. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55-56 (ist Cir. 2000) (holding
that comments that the plaintiff might not be able to balance work and family responsibilities after she
had a second child was sufficient for the jury to find that she was fired because of her gender); Troy v.
Bay State Computer Group, Inc., I40 F.3d 378, 381 (ist Cir. 1998); EEOC Guidance, supra note i, at
ii ("Title VII does not permit employers to treat female workers less favorably merely on the gender-
based assumption that a particular female worker will assume caretaking responsibilities or that a
female worker's caretaking responsibilities will interfere with her work performance.").
61. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 120-21 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that the view that a woman cannot be a good mother and have a job that requires long hours
reflects gender stereotypes); Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 502, 503 (Va. 1997) (employer
terminated new mother on the theory that her place was at home with her child); EEOC Guidance,
supra note I, at 14.
62. Back, 365 F.3d at I2o; EEOC Guidance, supra note I, at 14.
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"homemakers" who are less committed to the workplace than their full-
time colleagues.
63
As Williams and Bornstein discuss in this Issue, several theories are
available to challenge employment actions based on these stereotypes.64
Plaintiffs can use sex-plus theories under Title VII to challenge
employers who treat mothers worse than fathers in the workplace. 5
When employers act on stereotypes about mothers, plaintiffs can also or
instead advance a Title VII stereotype theory.66 Unlike sex-plus theories,
stereotype theories do not require comparative evidence from similarly
situated employees of the opposite sex. 7 In addition, workers of either
sex who take FMLA leave cannot be penalized or discriminated against
for making use of that leave.61 "[E]mployers cannot use the taking of
FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring,
promotions or disciplinary actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted
under 'no fault' attendance policies.
6
,
Stereotypes can be subtle, and it may be helpful to point out
research showing that gender stereotypes associated with caretaking can
affect decision making. For example, as Benard, Paik, and Correll
document in this Issue, subjects of experimental studies consistently rate
mothers as more warm, but less competent, and less worthy of
institutional rewards than women without children, or than men with or
without children." In addition, subjects in experimental studies hold
mothers to higher performance standards than other workers.7' Field
research suggests that bias is actually stronger in workplace settings.7"
Although stereotypes may be subtle, proving a gender stereotype theory
based on family responsibilities should not require expert testimony or
an onerous evidentiary showing. Courts have stated that it requires no
63. EEOC Guidance, supra note i, at 14.
64. See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 1344.
65. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 542 (i97i); see also Back, 365 F.3d at 118;
Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 199o).
66. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 294 (1989); Back, 365 F.3d at ii; EEOC
Guidance, supra note i, at 1 -i8.
67. Back, 365 F.3d at 121; EEOC Guidance, supra note i, at 8 ("[W]hile comparative evidence is
often useful, it is not necessary to establish a violation.").
68. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2008) ("An employer is prohibited from
discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have used FMLA leave.").
69. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2008).
70. See Benard et al., supra note 28, at 1372; Correll et al., supra note 28, at 1317-23; Amy J.C.
Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the Ice, 60 J. Soc. IssuEs 701,
709-I1 (2004).
71. Correll et al., supra note 28, at 132o; Kathleen Fuegen et al., Mothers and Fathers in the
Workplace: How Gender and Parental Status Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 6o J.
Soc. ISSuEs 737, 748 (2004).
72. Correll et al., supra note 28, at 1330; see also Catherine Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Social Institutions: Competing Discourses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights,
39 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 11, 30 (2005).
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special training to discern impermissible gender stereotypes in the view
that a woman cannot both be a good mother and work long hours, or
that mothers do not show the same level of commitment as other
workers because they have small children at home.73
LESSON 5
Stereotypes have a real impact on the workplace. They can affect
people's thinking before the moment of a decision-for example, in
subjective assessments of performance.
Stereotypes (implicit as well as explicit) may affect decision making
long before the "moment of decision" celebrated in Justice Brennan's
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins opinion:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of
decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response,
one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a
woman.
74
This motivating factor analysis rests upon an intuitive, but erroneous,
psychological theory that posits the existence of a conscious connection
between the decision makers' bias and the challenged employment
decision at the moment of decision.75
The intuitive "folk psychology" of discrimination is premised upon
four assumptions about the decision maker's bias: (i) it is conscious, (2)
it is a stable trait or disposition, (3) it is self-consciously evaluative (i.e., a
hostile animus), and (4) it operates at the moment of decision.76 Recent
advances in social psychology challenge the validity of this paradigm and
provide an entirely different picture of how bias affects decision making
in the employment context. Scientific experiments have demonstrated
that bias (i) may operate outside of the conscious awareness of the
decision maker; (2) is context dependent, rather than stable; (3) may
involve cognitive distortion rather hostile animus; and (4) affects the way
the stereotyped person is perceived long before "the moment of
decision. 77
How do stereotypes create disparate treatment at work prior to the
moment of decision? Human beings are creatures of habit. We think in
73. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3 d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2004); see also
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989).
74. 490 U.S. at 250.
75. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias
in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 6o J. Soc. ISSUEs 835, 839 (2004); Krieger
& Fiske, supra note 17, at ioio.
76. Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1247-54 (2001).
77. Anthony Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL.
L. REV. 945, 948-62 (2006).
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categories, and we use stereotypes to simplify the swirling stream of
sense data that constantly bombards us. In this view, social stereotypes
are an artifact of the way we categorize people. Disparate treatment
occurs when social stereotypes act as a "filter" that distorts the
perception of behavior. Cognitive bias has widespread impact on
employment because it affects how ambiguous behavior is interpreted,
stored in memory, recalled, and used to draw inferences. This "filtering"
affects everything from the providing of opportunity (who gets the plum
assignments) to interpretation of data (whose resume rates a call back);
from assumptions made about observed behavior (leaving a meeting
early) to drawing inferences about job performance (childcare
responsibility/lack of commitment versus business appointment/
independent go-getter).
Stereotypes may, but need not, be the product of animus. Types of
stereotypes include (i) prescriptive stereotypes of how a person is
supposed to behave-for example, all mothers should be home with their
children; (2) descriptive stereotypes of how a person is presumed to
behave-for example, all mothers will act a certain way (won't want to
travel or will want to leave early); (3) hostile stereotypes-for example,
all mothers are lazy, unreliable, and not committed to the job; and (4)
benevolent stereotypes that may be well meaning-for example, all
mothers need to spend time with their families so should not be selected
for jobs that require travel or intense hours."8 Older social psychological
research on "in-groups and out-groups" have identified predictable
behavioral patterns that bias the information in favor of those perceived
to be in the in-group and against those perceived to be in the out-group.79
Among those that are relevant to evaluation of performance are (i) in-
group favoritism (giving the in-group the benefit of the doubt versus
treating the out-group strictly by the book), (2) attribution bias (he's
talented, she's lucky), and (3) recall bias (facts that fit a stereotype are
recalled better than those that do not).'
Thus, even without "open and notorious" stereotyping by decision
makers at "the moment of decision" an evaluation process is not
necessarily free of bias based upon stereotypes. Stereotypes may appear
in a more subtle guise-lack of fit or leadership ability, for example.
78. See Joan C. Williams & Consuela A. Pinto, Family Responsibilities Discrimination: Don't Get
Caught Off Guard, 22 LAB. LAW. 293, 296 (2007); Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of
Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the
"Cluelessness" Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EmP. POL'Y J. 401, 426-30 (2003).
79. See, e.g., Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup
Discrimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 58 (David M.
Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); Janet K. Swim & Lawrence J. Sana, He's Skilled, She's
Lucky: A Meta-Analysis of Observers' Attributions for Women's and Men's Successes and Failures, 22
PERS'LTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 507 (1996).
8o. Williams & Pinto, supra note 78, at 417.
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Counsel should be alert to the possibility that stereotyped expectations
about job qualifications may adversely affect evaluation of individuals
who, by virtue of their membership in a certain social group, are
perceived to lack those qualities. For jobs stereotyped as masculine
(police officer) or requiring masculine traits (aggressiveness), the
perceived lack of fit between presumed "masculine" qualities and
"feminine" qualities makes it harder for a woman to succeed. There are
specific stereotypes keyed to gender that shape expectations people have
about women's competence."
Stereotyped assumptions about particular ethnic groups can create
the same "lack of fit" dynamic. Furthermore, circumstances that increase
the salience of the out-group member's status increase the effect (for
example, the "only" woman, the woman who becomes pregnant, the
adoption of gender-specific appearance standards).
To summarize, counsel must not take an employer's rating or
evaluation system at face value, but should probe whether gender, race,
or other protected category influenced how the rating system was
applied; moreover, counsel should educate her/himself about stereotypes
specific to clients' protected status that may have influenced the decision.
LESSON 6
Men experience FRD too. Social science research and a significant number
of FRD cases brought by men show that men, as well as women, encounter
FRD and gender stereotyping.
Stereotypes about gender and family responsibilities affect working
fathers as well. As Williams and Bornstein document in this Issue,82 men
may find that employers discourage them from using leave,83 retaliate
against them when they return from leave," or simply deny leave on the
basis that their spouses can or should handle family matters." These
81. CATALYST, WOMEN "TAKE CARE," MEN "TAKE CHARGE:" STEREOTYPING OF U.S. BUSINESS
LEADERS EXPOSED 6 (2005), http://www.catalystwomen.org/files/full/Women%/2oTake%2oCare /
2oMen%2oTake%2oCharge.pdf.
82. See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 1320-21.
83. Albiston, supra note 72, at 31-33; Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEx. L.
REv. 1047, 1077-78 (994). See generally Joseph H. Pleck, Are "Family-Supportive" Employer Policies
Relevant to Men?, in MEN, WORK, AND FAMILY 217 (Jane C. Hood ed., 1993).
84. In one experimental study, subjects rated men who took family leave as less likely to help
their coworkers, be punctual, work overtime, or have good attendance than men who did not take
family leave, or women regardless of leave-taking behavior. Julie Holliday Wayne & Bryanne L.
Cordeiro, Who Is a Good Organizational Citizen? Social Perception of Male and Female Employees
Who Use Family Leave, 49 SEX ROLES 233, 242 (2003). Another experimental study found that men
who took leaves of absence for parental reasons were less likely to be recommended for rewards than
were men who had not taken leave. Tammy D. Allen & Joyce E.A. Russell, Parental Leave of
Absence: Some Not So Family-Friendly Implications, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. i66, i85 (1999).
85. See, e.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3 d 625, 629-3
o
, 635-37 (4th Cir. 2ooi) (finding that a
supervisor's statements that "God made women to have babies and unless [plaintiff] could have a
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actions potentially violate Title VII because they penalize men who fail
to conform to the male breadwinner stereotype, essentially presenting a
Price Waterhouse theory in male form.86 As the Supreme Court has
noted, "[s]tereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by
parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for
men. Because employers continued to regard the family as the woman's
domain, they often denied men similar accommodations or discouraged
them from taking leave.""7 Thus, employers that discourage men from
making use of leave on the theory that men are not, or should not be,
family care takers impermissibly draw on gender stereotypes. Similarly,
employers that deny men leave on the basis that a mother (or other
woman) is available to provide care reinforce the stereotype that men
lack family responsibilities if any woman is present to handle them. Like
female plaintiffs who assert stereotype theories, male plaintiffs in
situations like these need not present comparator evidence from
similarly situated women to make a prima facie case of disparate
treatment; the employer's stereotype-driven reasoning is sufficient.
Discouraging workers from taking FMLA leave or penalizing them
when they do also violates FMLA. The statute prohibits interfering with,
restraining, or denying the exercise (or attempted exercise of) rights
granted by the Act. 'The regulations make clear that interfering with the
exercise of an employee's rights includes "not only refusing to authorize
FMLA leave, but [also] discouraging an employee from using such
leave."'  Accordingly, even employers that discourage both men and
women from using their leave rights violate FMLA. Also, employers
cannot rely on arguments that a mother is available to provide care in
order to deny FMLA leave to a father; a father is entitled to take leave if
he is needed to care for a sick child, even if the mother also contributes
to that child's care.'
baby, there is no way that [plaintiff] could be primary care [giver]" and that plaintiff's wife had to be
"in a coma or dead" for plaintiff to be considered the primary care giver violated federal law); Mora v.
Chem-tronics, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 12o6 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (rejecting the employer's argument that
the plaintiff was not needed to care for his dying son because his son's step-mother was a stay-at-home
mom).
86. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 294 (1989).
87. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) ("These mutually reinforcing
stereotypes create a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the
role of primary caregiver, and fostered employers' stereotypical views about women's commitment to
work and their value as employees.").
88. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004); see
also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731 n.5 (discussing how men are disadvantaged by stereotypes that caring for
family members is women's work).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(I) (2006).
90. 29 C.F.R. § 825.22o(b) (2008).
91. Mora v. Chem-tronics, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 12o6 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that any other
interpretation would mean a father would not be entitled to be with his dying child if that child's
June 2008]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
LESSON 7
Expert social science testimony explaining how implicit bias and
stereotypes can affect decision making is relevant to the issue of causation.
Such testimony may help the trier of fact draw an inference of
discrimination that the plaintiffs protected status was a motivating factor
in the challenged employment decision.
To be successful in an individual discrimination case, counsel must
not only provide factual evidence of discriminatory treatment. The
factfinder must also be persuaded to draw the inference that there is a
causal nexus between the plaintiff's protected status and the challenged
employment action(s).92 What role can expert social science testimony
play in convincing the factfinder that the plaintiff's protected group
status was a motivating factor in the employer's adverse action?
The social science expert witness will vary with the needs of the case.
Class action practitioners routinely use experts for statistical and social
framework analysis of data involving large populations, but social science
experts may also have a role to play in an individual case. Three
possibilities for using such experts in an individual case are described
below.
A. CORRECTING JUDICIALLY SANCTIONED, BUT OUTDATED, NOTIONS OF THE
NATURE OF BIAS
As Krieger and Fiske explain,
Antidiscrimination law has long incorporated and reified factual
suppositions about the nature of prejudice. Discriminatory motivation
is equated with conscious intentionality. Social decision makers are
presumed to have unimpeded access to the true reasons behind the
decisions they make. Social decision making is construed as a process
independent of social perception and judgment .... But well-
established insights from psychological science, accumulated over fifty
years of peer-reviewed, replicated research, has called these
suppositions into serious doubt, if not discredited them entirely.93
In an FRD case, counsel may need to explain how disparate treatment of
family caregivers is caused by their status, even when it is not a product
mother was also present). The regulations define "needed to care for" to include providing
psychological comfort and reassurance that would be beneficial to a seriously ill child. 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.I16(a) (2008).
92. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, IOI (2003) ("In order to obtain an instruction
under § 2oooe-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice."'); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989) ("It
is difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple words 'because of,' Congress meant to obligate a
plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the
employment decision she challenges. We conclude, instead, that Congress meant to obligate her to
prove that the employer relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to its decision.").
93. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 17, at io6i-62.
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of conscious intentionality or hostile animus. In such cases, social science
research may be a critical component of the causation element of the
case.
In Faigman, Dasgupta, and Ridgeway's article in this Issue, A Matter
of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, the
authors note that established social science research is available to
disabuse the trier of fact of the outmoded notion that the decision maker
has privileged access to the "real" reason behind his or her decision.94
Decision makers may be entirely unaware that the protected status of the
plaintiff influenced their judgment, and may be unable to report their
decision-making process accurately.95 Accordingly, there is little basis to
reject a discrimination claim on the grounds that the employer honestly
believed that he/she was not biased.
B. DEMONSTRATING THE INFLUENCE OF STEREOTYPES ON SOCIAL
COGNITION
Social science testimony may assist the trier of fact by describing the
content of social stereotypes associated with the plaintiff's protected
status, and by showing how stereotyped beliefs about the plaintiff's social
status can bias decision making. A classic example is assuming that a
mother lacks commitment based on evidence that she occasionally leaves
meetings early. The judgment is a result of the stereotyped assumption
that when she leaves a meeting early it is because of a childcare problem,
and a tendency to preferentially remember stereotype consistent
behavior (remembering every time she left early, while forgetting the
times she worked late).
Experimental evidence that people's interpretation of ambiguous
behavior is affected by social stereotypes can be used to demonstrate
that even well-intentioned decision makers may still treat employees
differently because of implicit bias. For example, presenting evidence
about the concept of "cognitive load" (that is, the impact being mentally
busy or limited in time or energy has on one's reliance on stereotypes)
may cause the trier of fact to reject an employer's "same actor" defense,
by demonstrating that the same decision maker may act differently under
different circumstances (for example, acting without bias when making a
focused hiring decision, but relying on stereotypes during fast-paced
work-related interactions thereafter)."
94. See Faigman et al., supra note 57, at 1404-07.
95. Id. at 14o4-06.
96. For further discussion of the "same actor inference" and the social science research that
contravenes the inference, see Krieger & Fiske, supra note 17, at 1044-52.
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C. EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE, NONDISCRIMINATORY EXPLANATIONS FOR
THE ACTION
Sociological studies of how social status affects competence
assumptions can assist the trier of fact in evaluating the validity of an
employer's chosen method for comparing performance vis a vis similarly
situated co-workers. Generalized studies of "in-group/out-group"
behavior may explain anomalies in peer review situations. Concepts such
as "role incongruity" can explain why similar behavior, interpreted
through stereotype, results in significantly different performance
evaluations.
As Faigman, Dasgupta, and Ridgeway conclude, "[e]xpert opinion
regarding how implicit bias can operate as a motivating factor that could
result in a discriminatory decision" should be admissible to assist the
trier of fact in deciding whether or not the evidence in the record is
sufficient to draw an inference that the plaintiff's protected status is a
motivating factor in the particular employment decision at issue.'
On the other hand, they opine, direct testimony from a social
scientist that discrimination has occurred in a specific case is
inadvisable." While a social scientist may be helpful in analyzing and
evaluating the facts of a specific case, care must be taken to ensure that a
testifying social science expert witness does not usurp the jury's function.
Evolving case law on this issue makes clear that this is a fine line, easy to
cross. For example, in Kotla v. Regents of the University of California, a
California appellate court overturned a jury verdict in which an expert
characterized evidence in the record as "indicators" that retaliation had
occurred."
LESSON 8
There is a gap between policy and practice in many organizations. Where
there are FRD-related policies on paper, practitioners should be interested
in what actually happens in practice at the workplace.
Sometimes workplaces adopt antidiscrimination policies that look
good on paper but don't mean much in practice. Organizational theorists
call this gap between a largely symbolic policy and the day-to-day
operations of the business a "decoupling."' Decoupling allows
organizations to signal to the outside world that they are making efforts
to comply with the law while not allowing those policies to interfere with
97. Faigman et al., supra note 57, at 1431; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
582-83 (1993).
98. See Faigman et al., supra note 57, at 1431-32.
99. 115 Cal. App. 4th 283, 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
ioo. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of
Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531, 1543-44 (1992).
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managerial goals or established practices."' As more and more
organizations in a given field adopt a particular policy, other
organizations feel pressure to do the same, whether or not that policy is
ever implemented.' 2 Formal policies can be important evidence in
discrimination cases, particularly since the Supreme Court suggested that
they are relevant, and in some instances can be raised as a defense in
sexual harassment actions.
Practitioners should beware the gap between policy and practice and
not take at face value organizational claims that discrimination could not
have happened because "we have a policy against that." Practitioners
should investigate whether the policy has any meaningful effect on
behavior within the workplace. In discovery, ask human resource
managers how they disseminate the policy and whether front line
supervisors are trained in its application. Investigate whether workers
ever use family-friendly policies: for example, ask how many of the
employees who recently had children took FMLA leave.0 4 Ask clients
whether there were any informal norms in their workplaces against using
family-friendly policies, and find out whether their employers
implemented these policies in an evenhanded way. Find out how the
employer resolves disputes that arise over the use of family-friendly
policies.' 5 Evidence that the policy is largely a sham can help undermine
claims that the policy is evidence of nondiscriminatory behavior and
suggest, to the contrary, that the defendant may have something to hide.
ioi. Id. at 1544.
102. Id. at 1545-46.
103. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding that an employer may
raise the promulgation of an anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure as part of an
affirmative defense); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-o8 (1998) (same, but also indicating a
failure to disseminate the policy is fatal to the defense); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72
(1986) (suggesting in dicta that the existence of a grievance procedure would be relevant to an
employer's liability for sexual harassment).
104. Employers are required by law to keep records of every FMLA leave taken by an FMLA
eligible employee, as well as copies of the leave policies provided to employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2616(b)
(2006); 29 C.F.R. § 825.500(c) (2008). Employers are also required to post information about FMLA
leave and to provide specific written information about employees' rights and obligations under the
statute. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.3oo(a), 825.301 (2oo8).
1O5. Some empirical research suggests that managers frame conflict over antidiscrimination
provisions as managerial concerns, downplaying the importance of potential legal claims. Albiston,
supra note 72, at 38-4o; Lauren B. Edelman at al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of
Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 497,511 (1993).
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LESSON 9
Injunctive relief is important to consider in individual cases, not just class
actions. Practitioners should be aware that the effectiveness of various
types of injunctive relief is the subject of current debate.
Lawyers representing employees should always consider, and in
most cases should include, a request for injunctive relief in the complaint
in an FRD case, whether the case is a class, multiple plaintiff, or
individual action. The payment of money damages in settlement or
resolution of a case often does not lead to improvements in the work
environment and is just factored into the employer's "cost of doing
business.""'6 It is important, therefore, for practitioners to push for
effective remedial relief whenever possible.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs' attorneys need to be aware that the most
effective injunctive relief may not be that which has been traditionally
considered or pursued. The effectiveness of various kinds of systemic
relief is the subject of current research and debate. It is important, when
considering what type of relief to pursue, to become familiar with the
current literature on this subject.
An excellent starting point is Green and Kalev's article in this Issue,
Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational Level." Another
useful article, also relatively current, is Best Practices or Best Guesses?:
Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity
Policies, by Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, published in the American
Sociological Review.' The social science research described and
compiled in these articles challenges conventional thinking. For example,
diversity training is frequently proposed as either the only remedy or
part of a package of remedial measures. Research shows, however, that
such training is not particularly effective, and indeed often causes an
unintended backlash among employees."9 On the other hand, appointing
a manager who is charged with the responsibility for ensuring diversity or
improvement in the working conditions of women and minorities has
been more effective in producing the desired changes."' This new
research also shows that formal mentoring and networking programs can
yield modest positive improvements. I"
io6. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 8i TEXAS L. REV. 1249 (2003).
107. Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational
Level, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1436 (2008).
io8. Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses?: Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate
Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. Soc. REV. 589,589 (2006).
IO9. Green & Kalev, supra note 107, at 1439; Kalev et al., supra note io8, at 593-94.
iio. Green & Kalev, supra note 107, at i44O; Kalev et al., supra note io8, at 591-93.
i i i. Green & Kalev, supra note io7, at i44o-4i; Kalev et al., supra note 1o8, at 594-95.
[Vo1. 59:1285
TEN LESSONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
Employees' attorneys should also consider consulting with social
scientists engaged in this research about the specifics of a particular case.
The input of these knowledgeable researchers could be valuable in
settlement negotiations or through a declaration submitted in support of
a motion for equitable relief, demonstrating the likely efficacy of
particular proposed remedial measures. When discussing or negotiating
injunctive remedies, it is useful to share this research with the employer's
counsel and the court or mediator who is involved in resolving the
matter. It will increase the likelihood that particular remedies are
accepted by the employer in settlement or imposed by the court by way
of an order or judgment.
Because of jurisdictional standing requirements, equitable relief is
generally available only where one or more plaintiffs remain employed
by the defendant employer."2 Nevertheless, when a case is brought by
just one or a few current employees, as well as in class cases, injunctive
relief may be an appropriate and important remedy. For example, in
cases involving "glass ceiling" promotion claims (which often involve
stereotyping issues) for women or minorities, formal mentoring and
networking programs could be considered. In many cases, changes or
improvements in personnel policies and practices should be discussed,
such as those relating to performance reviews, which often serve as the
basis for promotion decisions.
Injunctive relief might also include the posting of open positions or
upcoming vacancies so that interested employees can apply or make their
interest known. Again, this kind of change in policy and practice can help
overcome hidden or unconscious bias arising from stereotyping in FRD
cases (for example, assumptions that women with children don't want to
travel or would be unwilling to consider a transfer). A procedure
involving "self nomination" or one which allows for "expression of
interest" in such positions could be effective in overcoming such
stereotyping. Additional important issues for mothers and other
caregivers frequently include the availability of part-time positions or
flexibility in schedules. This is another critical area for counsel to explore
in many FRD cases.
Focusing time and energy on injunctive relief, particularly in
settlement discussions, may serve to convince the employer and its
counsel that the plaintiff is sincere in her desire to seek changes in the
workplace, rather than just money. In pursuing this avenue, plaintiffs'
counsel may also find unanticipated allies in enlightened human
resources managers and others who may have been internally advocating
for just such change themselves.
112. See, e.g., Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1132 (4 th Cir. 1995); Rau v.
Apple-Rio Mgt. Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1352 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
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There is a strong business case for reducing FRD in the workplace, and
plaintiffs' attorneys can make this part of their trial themes.
There are many reasons that an employer should adopt the kinds of
policies discussed in this Issue. It is the right and ethical thing to do, as
such policies would promote gender equity in the workplace, a concept
that is supported in our Constitution and statutes. Additionally, actions
taken to reduce FRD in the workplace are economically sound.
However, gender bias runs deep and even when the cost of such
discrimination is enormous, companies do not necessarily take serious
steps to eliminate or minimize the bias. We have seen this play out in the
slow and incremental response of companies to sexual harassment. For
example, according to the Houston Business Journal: "For a typical
Fortune 500 company, the costs of resolving such claims average $6.7
million per year, or $282 per employee. In contrast, meaningful measures
to prevent sexual harassment cost the firms only $200,000, or $8 per
employee.".. 3
Often it is gender bias that props up an employer's assumption that
the costs of implementing family-responsive policies in the workplace
outweigh the costs of discriminating against an employee because of
family responsibilities. When an employer raises cost as a defense to
discrimination, it should compel plaintiffs' attorneys to use the discovery
tools at their disposal to expose the assumptions on which this premise is
based. Employers should be queried about the costs of replacing the
employee who is alleging discrimination-for example, the costs of
recruiting and training a new employee, interrupting working
relationships within the office and with the employers' clients, and lost
productivity. If the employer expected litigation as a result of the
discrimination, then what cost did they associate with that? Practitioners
should not be surprised to find that the employer has no actual
information upon which the costliness defense is based. The failure to
provide any objective basis aids in establishing that this explanation was
purely pretextual. After exposing the lack of objective basis, it will be
telling to see how the defendant attempts to fill the void.
It may also be useful, both to the specific case and the process of
educating employers, to ask if the persons responsible for failing to
establish family-friendly policies are aware of studies documenting the
cost of the loss of talented employees or potential employees stemming
from the lack of such policies. For example, in its examination of the
legal profession, the Project for Attorney Retention (PAR) has found
113. Art Lambert, Sexual Harassment Claims: Insurers Help Clients Take Steps to Reduce Sexual
Harassment, HOUSTON Bus. J., Mar. 19, 2004, available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/houston/
stories/2004/03/22/focuS4.html.
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that, "[b]y conservative estimates, it costs a firm $200,000 to replace a
second-year associate," with "[o]ther estimates rang[ing] from $280,000-
$500,000..""4 PAR has developed an Attrition Cost Worksheet, designed
for legal employers but applicable to many industries, to enable
employers to calculate the costs of unwanted attrition in their particular
workplace."' Actually gathering data on the costs associated with not
making positive change to prevent FRD and attrition of talented
employees with family responsibilities may be eye opening to an
employer who can only see the immediate costs of implementing such
changes. Another avenue to explore is whether there is an expert that
can do the cost analysis for that industry or company to establish that it
is, in fact, contrary to the financial interests of the company to
discriminate in this manner.
In litigating cases that involve FRD, it is also important for
practitioners to check their own assumptions and stereotypes to see the
realities of the relevant workforce. Information available throughout the
sociological literature, as in some of the articles contained herein,
provides opportunity for practitioners to inform themselves, their
opposing counsel, and their clients about the impact of implicit biases
and stereotypes in the workplace. Thus the litigation of an individual
case may become the conduit for wider social change.
114. See Linda Bray Chanow, The Business Case for Reduced Hours, PROJECT FOR ATTORNEY
RETENTION, http://www.pardc.org/Publications/business-case.shtml (last visited June I, 2008) (citations
omitted) (costs include interviewing time spent by partners and associates at the firm, hiring bonuses,
lost training costs for the departed attorney and additional costs of training the new hire).
115. JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, SOLVING THE PART-TIME PUZZLE: THE LAW
FIRM'S GUIDE TO BALANCED HOURS 15 1-56 (2004).
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